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NSC review completed.

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
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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25X1 -- with regard to Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, it assumes our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines will remain invulnerable through 1985;

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		ξ., 
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		,
•	understood by the U.S. intelligence community and which give very	
•	scrious pause to this optimistic judgment;	
:		٠.
	with regard to Soviet capabilities against our bombers, it	
: : OEV4	ignores the vulnerability of SAC bases to cruise and ballistic missiles from submarines operating off U. S. shores, vulnerability of the air-	• ;
25X1	craft to mid-course intercept,	•
. OEV4	orace to real-course rated cope,	, <i>:-</i>
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	the NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment and thus the	•
•	added weight of "operational" consideration, when in substance it is not.	
	(For example, it assumes without detailed examination the survivability	
	of the U.S. command and control apparatus, and accepts optimistic and unproven data regarding U.S. silo hardness.)	
٠.	and amproved data regarding o. D. ollo haraness.	٠.
	These general criticisms may be best illustrated by a brief review of	
• •	available evidence which contrasts with NIE judgments in three critical	
•	areas: Soviet ICBM accuracy, POLARIS vulnerability, and U.S. bombe	r. P
•	penetrability.	_
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		Transmentaristica in the	·		
	•	Having identified what	we believe to be s	erious deficiencia	es in this
	• • •	NIE, there follows a state problems and some	eries of observed	ons examining the	nature of
•		problems and some	s suggestions for t	merr resolution.	
		Observations on the In	telligence Estima	ing Process	
		•			
	•	The root cause of the p	oroblems experien	ced both by the in	telligence
		community and the use	rs of intelligence:	is the lack of fact	1127 224
	. :	and the difficulty of for	' <b>ec</b> asting ten year:	into the future.	Recause of
	•	the importance attache	d to some intellige	ace subjects." the	rain
•		understandable desire	to fill some of the	intelligence hole	with judg-
<i>:.</i>		ments. These judgment fact, and can then lead	its can then gain a hoth the intelligen	n acceptance app	roaching
		of intelligence into a si	note the unitarity of	ch rejects altern	d the users
•	.*	can persist too long. (	Only when some su	irprise arises, to	talls contra
•		to the intelligence tren	d, is the pattern b	roken and another	"Taview"
	٠,	ordered of the intellige	nce effort.		
			•		
		When decisions must be	made, they are a	lmost always bas	ed on .
	:	incomplete information	. When they invol	ve intelligence in	formation,
:		the decision-maker sho	uld wish to know r	of only the facts	but also the
		best judgments of the in	itelligeace commu	nity and have son	e feeling
	•	for the uncertainties coposible situations cons	inected with the do	There was an	luding other
•	•	lead the decision-make	r to consider whet	her he should had	aunties should
		or to be prepared for p	ossible reverses o	onnected with fair	ge his bets
•		actions (or inactions) be	ased on these asse	saments.	rares or
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		This is not an easy proc	ess; no one know	s how to weigh ju	demental
	•	uncertainties. For this	reason we look u	pon the process o	f attempting
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to analyze and communicate uncertainties in the area of national assessment as a process with which we must continue to experiment, trying various modes in an attempt to find a more satisfactory procedure. This leads us to the following suggestions:

## Suggestions for Resolving Observed Deficiencies

I. Those aspects of intelligence which are considered critical by key decision-makers should be subject to separate and competitive analyses and such alternate views as are developed should be presented to the President and other users. In our view, this suggestion deserves the highest priority for consideration and implementation.

II. To avoid the tendency of decision-makers to force the intelligence community to come up with positions when the data is too meager, the following suggestion may be helpful. The user should formulate his alternative choices of action in such a way as to permit the intelligence community to marshal its evidence around each alternative. Thus, the community would be asked to make its best case that we face a serious problem, and its best case that we do not.

The purpose of this suggestion is to try to maintain an awareness of the limitations in the intelligence information. In addition, it stimulates the user to provide important feedback to the intelligence community on his interests and problems which, in turn, can motivate the intelligence community to provide a more complete and useful product to the user.

III. NIE 11-3/8-74 has the tendency to phrase the estimate as a net assessment, that is, to include an assessment of U. S. capabilities in the face of the threat in question. We suggest that the National Security Council adopt a three-step process. The first step is the generation of a purely intelligence document, the NIE, which carefully avoids the impression that a net assessment has been performed. The second step would involve a genuine net assessment, requiring participation by both the intelligence community and other agencies (Department of Defense, State, etc.), under the aegis of the NSC. The third and final step would involve a thorough critique of the net assessment document for the NSC by an entity which is enabled to function with an appropriate degree of independence.

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## Summary

We believe that the policy-maker would be better served by an NIE which clearly identifies that which is fact and that which is judgment, and which identifies the intelligence gaps prevailing at various stages in the analytic process. The product would also be more useful if the decision-makers provided more specific guidance regarding the relevant, contemporary issues with which they are confronted, and on the most useful format for presentation of the intelligence.

Finally, Mr. President, we recommend that you direct the NSC to implement these suggestions, insofar as possible, with respect to formulation of this year's NIE on Soviet Strategic Forces which is now in progress and, as appropriate, to the national intelligence estimating process.

Respectfully,

George W. Anderson, Jr. Admiral, USN (Ret.) Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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